Retain the monarchy?
Monarchists see the agitation for change as pointless, asking, in effect, since Australia is a republic in all but name, why 'mess' with it?' Republicans counter with the question: why not change the Constitution to reflect our evolution as a de facto republic-that is, to complete the paperwork?Prime Minister Howard claims that our system works well, so it makes no sense to replace it with a republic. Furthermore, he claims that our system cannot be replicated under a republic. Quite likely, but is our present system really that good? Unfortunately it does not work well. That was the reason for the 'dustup' in 1975-the fractious nature of party politics combined with our 'bi-cameral' (upper and lower house) system of government. Many have pointed out the real problem; the dominance of the Prime Minister and cabinet over parliament; but in 1975 it was the opposition leader who was able to use his party's majority in the Senate to manoeuvre the government out of office, whatever the rights and wrongs of the matter were.
Republicans claim a national maturity demands change; but there is a serious question whether we have the political maturity to make sensible change. Many think an elected president will automatically rectify the problems of the system by giving the people more power. That could be a strong factor behind the 'elect the president' campaign, and is probably best seen as adverse comment on our political system. Clearly, an elected president could become involved in disputing executive authority, becoming one more source of power in a conflict between president, Prime Minister and parliament, with all the problems of an American-style republic. Confusion is further multiplied by the view expressed by members of the High Court that it might be better able to reflect the will of the people than the executive-more claimants for executive authority. In all this, where will we find really practical representative government?
Paul Keating (the one who enjoyed 'pulling the levers') commented on the (possible) danger: 'The pressure will grow to give Australia an elected presidency in the future, a position that will enjoy the full reserve powers of an English monarch. Such a development would change forever the political primacy of the Parliament, Prime Minister and Cabinet in our political system'.1
There is another problem. The tenure of an elected head of state could easily exceed the parliamentary term giving a preponderant political clout to that office. Parliament and executive could be reduced to a role of irritated frustration, like that of present parliamentary oppositions.
Monarchists quote another argument against a change that would separate us from the beneficent effects of attachment to the crown, which, in theory, binds the whole political structure to the moral government of God. This is represented in the coronation of the Queen. Before the Queen could receive the sceptre of royal rule, she must first accept the golden orb representing the earth, surmounted by the cross of Christ-He who by life and death demonstrated the divine humility, and now is honoured above all as King of kings, emphasising that the only way to real authority is by complete submission to a higher authority. Religious form (and other traditions) can be worse than useless.
Does the crown have any moral influence today? Mr. McGarvie has been heard to say that, while Governor of Victoria, this aspect never entered his mind. When traditions are purely formal they can be of little value. Does the traditional regalia of barristers improve the justice of our legal system? As time goes by the real values lost have to be rediscovered; more easily perhaps without the traditional trappings. Perhaps we may reflect that God is not a remote figment of religious imagination but the Spirit that moves in the world, able to impart His wisdom, guidance and blessing, to those whose search is sincere.
The principle is plain. Those who submit to higher, legitimate authority receive the right, the power, to rule. In a substantially secular society the ultimate authority is unquestionably the people.
At times it may well be said with Alcuin, 'the voice of the people is the voice of God…' Authority belongs to those who will rightly exercise it, for the benefit of the people, caring for the people's problems, and considering their views. Republicans see 'the people' as the ultimate authority, but do we have the practical virtue required to exercise that authority?
Those who seek power for themselves are, ipso facto, not fit for its exercise. Power is a contagious 'disease', waiting to infect whoever it is to whom the people surrender their power at election. More power means more conflict. Democracy is about the reverse, limiting delegations of power to the minimum required. Thus the answer lies in reducing the powers of the powerful, commonly called devolution. Monarchists say that the Governor-General has no power, practically speaking, and that the existing convention of formal reference of appointment of ministers and enactment of bills, to the Governor-General limits the power of the executive, if only by reason of the formalities of its observance. This is fragile. Even minimal change might bring down the whole house of cards.
Like the elephant, 'which is so slow', the people as a whole tend to find change a worry and appear to prefer putting up with unsatisfactory politics rather than an unknown alternative, the devil you don't know. Distrust and fear play a big part in conservatism; but what if the system we cling to is riddled with distrust and fear anyway?
To retain as much control as possible over one's destiny is a natural urge. It appears strongly in the movements for civil liberties. The problem is that in many ways we need the benefits of common action, which require communication and sometimes compromise, and even the surrender of certain liberties for the greater good, and a greater freedom. Those benefits will not be realised if the basis of decision-making is distorted with more opportunity for advantage to some than to others.
Serious change is needed. We need a better basis of government. Could it be done better under a republic? The Melbourne Age editor comments:
- Most Australians are not monarchists; the challenge is to find acceptable change… There is majority support for a republic but, as yet, no consensus on what form it should take. While The Age believes the model that was on offer represented safe and minimal change, its rejection means another must be found; one that will not jeopardise our parliamentary democracy but that is also acceptable to the public ... It will not be easy but it is not impossible. 2
A Republic?
There has been a minority interest in a republic for a long time. Various factors have provided the impetus in recent years. Previous to World War Two there were strong connections with Britain, including trade and defence ties. Since then Australia's interests have centred more about the Pacific region.In 'Couchman over Australia', a TV program some years ago on the subject of an Australian republic, one young fellow made an eloquent case for a republic being a way to unite all Australians in a forward looking, truly Australian identity. That is an interesting thought; and, incidentally, a fine example of the kind of leadership we need, rather than the kind of leadership we see, based on decisive power.
Would a republic produce that? Can a Westminster system such as ours accommodate the needed social revival?
Whatever system we may consider suited to this country's future needs, the ability for it to provide unifying and creative leadership for the broad spectrum of Australian society would be most important. Increasingly we are seeing, throughout the world, a serious failure of present forms of democratic government to resolve the problems of competing groups; problems that may get worse rather than better. We need to be prepared for an unpredictable future.
A mere change from a formal monarchy to a typical republic has little chance of resolving this country's problems with peace and goodwill. Clearly there is work to do to have a uniquely Australian solution-one that is sound, and will enhance the life of the nation.
The Constitution
The 1901 Constitution retained the full authority of the crown through a Governor-General. In the written Constitution this still prevails, although the crown's authority has been whittled away by United Kingdom and Australian enactments. On the other hand, the Governor-General and State Governors are still technically able to exercise the powers of the crown in accordance with the Constitution.Australia is a federation of States, not a unitary country like the United Kingdom is at present. (The winds of change appear to be blowing there too, with separate parliaments in Scotland and Wales: and Northern Ireland?) We have a written constitution, established by referendum, giving the constitutional powers to the Senate that created the tension between the two houses of parliament.
The new states had to be given confidence that their interests were to be secure in the new federal government so, special powers for the Senate were designed to encourage the smaller colonies to join. The problem was resolved by establishing the Senate with the same number of representatives for each State, regardless of population, and giving the Senate certain powers to amend or reject House of Representatives legislation-including the power to withhold the supply of finance for the operation of government.
A simple but effective way to rationalise the difficulties between the two houses of parliament is needed.
In the German federation, the seats in the upper house are filled by their State parliaments to protect the interests of the states. (Their system also incorporates the principle of 'subsidiarity', with lower levels of government retaining maximum feasible authority to avoid the dangers of centralisation that occurred so disastrously under Hitler.)
The Dismissal
In 1975 the 'reserve powers' of the Crown were used by Governor-General Sir John Kerr to dismiss the Whitlam government, the incident highlighting the need for a fresh look at many of the provisions of the Constitution, which previously bound Australia to Britain as a colony.Party politics had become a major factor in the operation of the Senate. The Senate powers originally designed to protect the smaller States, were now employed in accordance with House of Representatives party politics.
Rightly or wrongly, the conflict between the two houses was a catalyst for a revival of interest in Australia's altered relationship with the Crown; some probably thinking that a president (of a republic) could have resolved the problem in favour of Whitlam's 'elected government'.
However the real question is: 'Could a new system resolve such conflicts and, at the same time, ensure the political neutrality of the president?'
The 1995 (20th) anniversary of the dismissal produced its sheaf of literature on the event, with no obvious way to ease the basic conflict between the two houses of parliament. Preferred suggestions reflected partisan positions: Gough Whitlam called for fixed terms; the Democrats wanted entrenchment of Proportional Representation in the Constitution to ensure their role in the Senate and the coalition wanted no change-that is, until thwarted by the newer multi-party Senate blocking the Coalition's bills.
With the advent of minor parties and independents in the Senate the opposition in the House of Representatives is now unlikely to ever dominate the Senate. With this new trend in Senate voting the people have largely resolved the danger of a standoff between the two houses, since the government simply has to come to terms with those holding the balance of power in the Senate. There are complaints about the minor interests which are able to wield 'the balance of power', saying that minorities in the Senate have no right to dominate the majority in the lower house. Nevertheless a combination of various senators with the numbers necessary to oppose a government policy is a majority-in the Senate.
Although the original aim of the Constitution, to protect of the concerns of the less populated states has been swept aside by party politics, it does seem that they will continue to provide most of the Senate minor-party and independent senators. These are perhaps enough to enable a brake on legislation that bothers those states' interests.
Majority rule is necessary as the basis of democratic decision-making, but the split of decision-making into two houses, while considered necessary to protect the smaller states, has created ongoing angst. (By contrast, the House of Commons have had sole political power, although tempered somewhat by traditional respect for the Crown.)
We are now faced with an important decision: to do nothing, or to venture into the brave new world of change. The public has lost a lot of confidence in government, with resulting apathy and cynicism, but the symbolism of the change of century and the anniversary of Federation was an encouragement to reconsider the options. The unifying link to the crown had suffered the ravages of time and the majority of the people seemed to favour an elected president, although this could possibly make political tensions much worse rather than better. Would a president be more likely to challenge a Prime Minister? It could depend on the nature of the republic we create; a serious question. We must not just 'buy' another country's failed system.
The Queen's relationship with Australia, as head of the Commonwealth of Nations, may well continue in the same way it does with other Commonwealth countries, whether they are monarchies or republics, but there is an unfilled gap in our national life which calls for a symbolic head of state, a role similar, in some respects, to that once inspiringly filled by the crown.
It's up to us. Will we be clever or stupid? We can make the 'mess' good-or we can make a good mess of it.
What sort of republic?
Would a change to a republic be seen as the be-all and end-all? If so, we could leave one state of confusion to create another. Some remarks by Sir William Deane (when Governor-General) stimulate thought about the nature of a presidential role under a republic. Some politicians have been upset that his remarks could be influential in the republic debate. While he has his defenders as well as his critics, he himself recognised early that to be other than a mere figurehead (a role that has steadily metamorphosed with recent incumbents) a fine line has to be drawn between highlighting the problems of the disadvantaged, with empathy, and proposing or commenting on solutions, which would be engaging in politics.Empathy with those in need is a royal quality. Princess Diana had it. So had Sir William. That is a contribution for which a head of state will always be revered. But our system muddies the waters and some therefore criticise, fearing an influence prejudicial to their own interests. Traditionally, the Queen has had 'the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, the right to warn'.3 A revered president ought to be able to enjoy a similar role.
In moving on however, wnotese need to consider how our head of state could be such a revered person; one who could be a unifying influence, ameliorating the disunity of our political life. A head of state can have a unique function in exemplifying and expressing those values around which a people can unite and move on to better things. A party politician cannot do this, but a non-political head-of-state might, especially perhaps if elected; but it would all depend on the efficacy of the system we adopt.
We, the people, must come to grips with the system ourselves, and place no reliance on failing examples of other realms past. It must be friendly to our own evolving, progressive values, which we must find, and promote. We need to 'gird up our loins', reject fear of change and get used to believing in the 'righteous cause'. We must set to work to fix our own political system which is most definitely 'broke' with its party politics, highlighted once again by the threat of John Howard to reimpose party discipline over the 'recalcitrant' republicans in his coalition; his, mind you! How blind are the powerful to the truth: 'Pride goes before … a fall' . 4 How many party leaders have felt its bitter truth! Yet arrogant attitudes persist, under our retarded system.
A viable Australian republic?
There appears, fortunately, to be a substantial consensus that a future head of state should not be involved politically. The visit of the Irish president gave us an insight into how well Ireland has progressed with such a president. (Incidentally, Ireland is not a federation of states.)We have valued the more public involvement of Governors-General in recent times, and we could certainly do with an apolitical figure giving national focus on unity and uplift, in the manner that the royal family was once seen to do, and which Irish presidents appear to have achieved. The nation needs more than party politics, sport and entertainment for us to mature and grow as a nation. An elected, apolitical president could perhaps give us the inspiring moral leadership we need.
There remains one question though: is a greater involvement of the people possible without creating a political decision-making process that is too unstable? We would need:
- Amendment of the Constitution to formalise our de facto republic.
- A better solution to the problems between the House of Representatives and the Senate.
- A close definition of function to avoid involvement of a president in political controversy.
Alternatives
Appointment of a president?
Should a president be appointed by a two-thirds majority of parliament (a reasonable course perhaps), a curious problem emerges in regard to a simple transfer of the existing conventions as suggested by the Prime Minister.At present the Queen appoints the Governor-General on the advice of the Prime Minister. Then the Governor-General is obliged by convention to accept the advice of the Prime Minister, reflecting Australia's rise to independent status, and the Crown's decline towards irrelevance.
With a republic the authority of the president would stand, not on regal influence but on the two-thirds majority of both houses, establishing a non-partisan president with something more than a formal authority. Would the Prime Minister be required, as under the existing protocol, to formally present his proposed cabinet appointments to the president? Is it not possible that a president with this bi-partisan status would have the practical authority to exert influence on the Prime Minister with regard to the composition of the cabinet? It seems conceivable that this kind of influence could also appear with regard to controversial issues.
Would this be an altogether bad thing? This interesting possibility might be of some political comfort to the opposition, so presently ineffective. It is quite plain that the present powers of the opposition have been far too much circumscribed by party government. Could such a president become too influential? Maybe, but it would seem to indirectly strengthen the role of parliament; perhaps worth a thought.
The McGarvie proposal?
The Hon. Richard McGarvie (former Governor of Victoria), put forward the following plan at the Constitutional Convention: a republic with a low-key president appointed by a council of ex-Governors-General. This model received the second vote at that Convention.The main idea was the appointment of a president by a committee of three senior figures or elders, with little else changed. The formal reference made to the Queen in the current system could thus be replaced by reference to the committee of elders regarding matters f appointment and tenure.
However, such a council of elders, replacing the Queen, might retain the reserve powers under the Constitution and acquire total power over government; including the power of veto over legislation. Nevertheless it has been cautioned by Professor Raff 5 that retention of the reserve powers could be justiciable under a new constitution. Would the High Court then have the greater political power? What then of the separation of powers? That has been seriously jeopardised already, with the dominance of the executive and the High Court's appeal to the Common Law in its review of legislation.
This option is continuing to be proposed by Mr. McGarvie.
A Committee of state Governors?
It has been suggested that, when occasion requires, a committee of State Governors and former Governors-General should convene, and privately invite a highly respected citizen to accept appointment. A requirement that any possible exercise of reserve powers by a president be referred to this committee seems logical.This arrangement could give a significant participation of the people in each State, through their own political channels. For example, each Governor could confer with the Premier and opposition leader on questions relating to new appointments.
Removal of the president (under a special circumstance of inability to perform the functions of the presidency) would be a matter for the committee.
It may be objected that this proposal is still too far from a satisfactory involvement of the people, but it appears to merit consideration. One significant advantage, apart from its simplicity, would be the equality of influence it would give for all States in the ultimate appointment. Also, the existing constitutional arrangements with regard to parliament might remain substantially as at present.
An elected president?
It was interesting to see in an opinion poll that, while 52 per cent of people favoured a republic, the number agreeing increased to 58 per cent when the question precluded a president with executive powers. It was equally interesting to hear of countries, such as Ireland, which have a non-executive president. In a 'Four Corners' symposium on a republic some time ago, there was a distinct emphasis that we should not blindly follow the example set by another country, but should create our own form of republic.The Australian Republican Movement's efforts to ensure a break from Britain failed by supporting a minimal republic; many voters apparently being in favour of an elected president. That disposition may have been fed not only by a normal dislike of party governments, but also by voters possibly being unaware of possible difficulties of government under an elected president.
There is some concern that an elected presidency could lead us down America's path. It is clear that we need the inspiration of a head of state who we can 'own', but the American system has a powerful executive with president-appointed 'ministers', and is much more accountable to the influences of 'big money' than at earlier times when the parties were largely in the hands of the grass roots. Party politics is, and always has been, a destructive factor in many systems. Our trend is the same, and will be more so in future with the recent totalitarian legislation for tax deductibility of political donations. Incredible! We need to call a halt to these alien influences.
To achieve an elected presidency with a secure basis of representative parliamentary government could be a worthwhile challenge. An elected president would have a significant apolitical role; one that avoids any interference in parliamentary government.
This was considered by the Convention to be impossible, but it is interesting that Professor Cheryl Saunders of the Constitutional Centenary Foundation thinks otherwise. When chairing a CCCF meeting when Paul Kelly of 'The Australian (newspaper)' was declaiming on the impossibility of such a definition of powers, a quiet aside from the Chair advised that it is possible. She, if anyone, would know.
The election of a president need not be feared if political powers are thus excluded. Who is elected would be important, of course, but not critically. For example, Bill Hayden, former left-wing politician, reacted to the job of Governor-General in much the same way as more establishment figures have done. We have had a variety of Governors-General already without problems. Obviously, the established nature of the office is a dominant factor and, with the president's powers properly defined, whoever is elected can be sure to act constructively within those powers. Not only so but the people would incline towards outstanding figures with no political involvement.
It is clear that a president, with a formal, restricted role, could not interfere with parliamentary government, and making an election of such a president an issue of partisan political power would be pointless. Therefore the election of a president really presents no big drama or danger to our democratic system; rather the reverse, provided only that the powers assigned to this office are clearly spelt out to safeguard the democratic process.
Do those who polled 70 per cent for a directly elected president want to emulate America? Or do they have another vision; perhaps a president to make the 'pollies' behave? If a directly elected president had any power to interfere in legislation, or to exercise executive power, then big money would be bound to intrude to secure a president at the beck and call of those powerful interests, with much resulting damage and confusion.
Phil Cleary, Real Republic/Direct Election Movement, is optimistic, commenting:
- Australians won't be dragooned into supporting a republic that shuts them out of the political process. The challenge is to develop a republic model that addresses the concerns and aspirations of Australians. If that means a model that avoids the excesses of the American system, then so be it. Contrary to the claims of some, it is possible to fashion a republic model that restricts the ability of big money to determine the outcome of a presidential election. Any number of constitutional lawyers has confirmed this. (It is) a ridiculous notion that Australians would elect a vacuous celebrity or partisan politician. 6
Nomination
The public could be quite capable of nominating people of outstanding character and public spirit for the office of president, the popular support being rapidly established in the activity of all public forums without (expensive, or harmful) government intervention, with possible names well profiled by the media. Thus the person chosen by the people would be held in very high esteem, one who has risen in the public mind by a process of natural selection, a process beyond the reach of political influence, provided the presidency has only formal powers.A person so chosen, not officially nominated, not self-nominated or self-promoted, could accept the honour implicit in such a call to this high office. This person would be highly respected and perhaps formally consulted by government from time to time, as the Queen has been wont to be consulted by British Prime Ministers, with courtesy and respect. Both the Prime Minister and our Australian democratic system would be enhanced by such unifying consultation.
A Head of State
Serious difficulties, which may occur between the Senate and the House of Representatives, will continue to require an involvement of a head of state, unless another way can be devised. Such difficulties do not occur in countries that do not have state governments and an upper houses with constitutional powers.In 1975, the (opposition) majority in the Senate had failed to pass a stockpile of government bills that could have triggered a double dissolution, except that the established convention, that the Governor-General must accept the 'advice' of the Prime Minister, (who was not the one wanting a double dissolution) prevented that occurring.
The 'supply' bills held over in the Senate caused a taut government financial situation, which invited the Governor-General to call upon the 'reserve powers'; the powers of the crown still contained in the Constitution.
To the surprise of many, the Governor-General exercised these reserve powers. Sir John Kerr dismissed the Prime Minister (who had been determined to retain government and could easily have dismissed him), replacing him with the leader of the opposition, who undertook to 'advise' dissolution of parliament.
One factor in this drama was the three months delay available to the Senate to hold back bills. It is of interest to think of the 1901 environment in which this time factor was set. The federal government was born with a very limited area of responsibility. Moreover, for parliament to meet, MPs and senators had to travel to the parliament in Melbourne, some even by boat. The sense of the three months provision is not hard to see. Today, perhaps even a week might be feasible, the issue coming to a head quickly, and a joint sitting of parliament quickly resolving the deadlock.
With a number of senators not 'belonging' to the government or the opposition, the position has changed, as we have seen, and a serious impasse between the two houses on account of finance is unlikely to happen again; without public uproar. The danger is still there though, should the composition of the Senate return to the earlier pattern.
Some seem to believe that we need a president with political authority as an 'antidote' to executive government. This correlates with a claim by High Court Justices, mentioned earlier, that they might sometimes be more able than the government to truly represent the people. The unrest of many people, reflected in the desire to elect a head of state, may have much to do with the bad reputation of politicians, the people's lack of real representation, and the dominance of executive government.
Parliamentary secret ballots could provide an answer, displacing party politics and improving the democratic standing of both houses. To resolve a controversial situation, on appeal to the president, both houses could be obliged, as a constitutional obligation, to settle the issue with a secret ballot. Should the Senate vote reject the bill(s), the total of the secret votes of both houses would determine the result for each issue, in the same manner as a joint sitting. As the House of Representatives, having the larger numbers, might too easily prevail, some delays or other modifications might be needed. Supply should not be a problem, perhaps covered by convention or constitutional provision. A hung situation could be handled by a provision for a delayed further vote, or be the prescription for a double dissolution.
Such a constitutional change appears to satisfy the intent of the founding fathers, who obviously did not intend to create an all-powerful government in the House of Representatives, nor anticipate the difficulties caused by the rise of strictly disciplined parties.
While lessening party-based confrontation, this application of the ballot could also obviate any call for a 'political' involvement of a head of state. With only formal powers for that office, the anxiety of some, as to the powers an elected president of a republic might exercise, could disappear.
We are a fragmented nation. We need the inspiration of a highly respected head of state that has the formal capacity to defuse difficult situations, but without the confusion and embarrassment of political interference and consequent partisan implications. By clearly specifying the powers of the head of state, the concerns of those who fear an elected president could be resolved.
Whether we have a republic or not, we need better political arrangements to improve cooperation between the different aspects of the democratic process.
Dismissal of a president
An appointed president would no doubt suffer dismissal for publicly unacceptable behaviour. In such an event, a letter of dismissal would be 'tabled' in parliament, and voted by secret ballot of members without debate. The idea of arguing over such a matter in parliament would not be edifying, or in the public interest. Immediate transmission of the letter would follow a requisite two-thirds majority without delay.An elected president could not be dismissed, but might be requested to resign by a two-thirds majority of both houses of parliament, in the unlikely event of some publicly unacceptable behaviour.